Towards Trustworthy Machine Learning

Training-time and Test-time Integrity

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計算機科學及工程學系

Machine learning

Beyond Accuracy

TESLA AUTOPILOT —

Researchers trick Tesla Autopilot into steering into oncoming traffic

Stickers that are invisible to drivers and fool autopilot.

DAN GOODIN - 4/1/2019, 8:50 PM



The Washington Post

WorldViews

Syrian hackers claim AP hack that tipped stock market by $136 billion. Is it terrorism?



By Max Fisher

April 23, 2013 at 4:31 p.m. EDT

Microsoft silences its new A.I. bot Tay, after Twitter users teach it racism [Updated]

Sarah Perez @sarahintampa / 10:16 am EDT • March 24, 2016

Comment

Microsoft's newly launched A.I.-powered bot called Tay, which was responding to tweets and chats on GroupMe and Kik, has already been shut down due to concerns with its inability to recognize when it was making offensive or racist statements. Of course, the bot wasn't *coded* to be racist, but it "learns" from those it interacts with. And naturally, given that this is the Internet, one of the first things online users taught Tay was how to be racist, and how to spout back ill-informed or inflammatory political opinions. [**Update**: Microsoft now says it's "making adjustments" to Tay in light of this problem.]

Trustworthy ML
What and why

- Not alchemy
  - Explainability
  - Security
  - Privacy
  - Fairness
  - Integrity
  - …
- Establish model understanding



THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

人工智能安全测评白皮书
（2021）

国家语音及图像识别产品质量监督检验中心
国家工业信息安全发展研究中心人工智能所
2021 年 10 月

Trustworthy ML
Integrity

- Training-time integrity and Testing-time integrity

Attack Category	**Attack Target**	**Attack Mechanism**	**Training Process**	**Inference Process**
Backdoor Attack	Misclassify attacked samples; Behave normal on benign samples.	Excessive learning ability of models.	Under control.	Out of control.
Adversarial Attack	Misclassify attacked samples; Behave normal on benign samples.	Behavior differences between models and humans.	Out of control.	Attackers need to generate adversarial perturbation through an iterative optimization process.
Data Poisoning	Reduce model generalization.	Overfitting to bad local optima.	Can only modify the training set.	Out of control.

Training-time Integrity

Training-time integrity

Backdoor attacks

- Perform maliciously on trigger instances
- Maintain similar performance on normal data.



Training-time integrity

Backdoor attacks

- $\min \sum_{j=1}^{|\mathcal{D}_p|} \ell(f_i(\tilde{x}_j), y_t) + \lambda \sum_{k=1}^{|N|} \ell(F(x_j), f_i(x_j))$
- Where $A(x_i, y_t) = \tilde{x}_i$



Training-time integrity

Taxonomy of backdoor attacks



Fig. 2. Taxonomy of poisoning-based backdoor attacks with different categorization criteria. In this figure, the red boxes represent categorization criteria, while the blue boxes indicates attack subtypes.

Training-time integrity

Taxonomy of backdoor attacks



Training-time integrity

Backdoor attacks in text

- Trigger could be a word, a short phrase, or a syntax



Training-time integrity

Counter Backdoor attack

- Backdoor detection
  - Build a detector to tell whether a given neural network contains a backdoor
- Backdoor analysis
  - Target label prediction
    - Identify the target label
  - Trigger Synthesis
    - Reverse-engineer the trigger

Backdoor detection

By distribution difference

- Final hidden layer output distributions (kernel density estimation based)



Backdoor analysis

Neural Cleanse



- $\min_{m,\Delta} \ \ell(y_t, f(A(x, m, \Delta))) + \lambda \cdot |m|$

  for $x \in X$
- $A(x, m, \Delta) = x' \quad x'_{i,j,c} = (1 - m_{i,j}) \cdot x_{i,j,c} + m_{i,j} \cdot \Delta_{i,j,c}$

Backdoor defenses

By class-wise explanation

$$\min_{\mathcal{S}} \mathcal{D}(\boldsymbol{\theta}^{\mathcal{S}}, \boldsymbol{\theta}^{R}) \quad \text{s.t} \quad \boldsymbol{\theta}^{\mathcal{S}} = \underset{\boldsymbol{\theta}}{\operatorname{argmin}} \ \mathcal{L}^{\mathcal{S}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) := \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}|} \sum_{i=1}^{|\mathcal{S}|} \mathcal{L}(f_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\boldsymbol{x}_i), \boldsymbol{y}_i)$$



Test-time Integrity

Test-time integrity

Adversarial examples

- An adversarial example can easily fool a deep network
- Robustness is critical in real systems



Bagle piano



stop sign speed limit 40

Test-time integrity

Why matters

- Adversarial examples raises trustworthy and security concerns
- Critical in high-stake, safety-critical tasks
- Helps to understand the model and build a better one (SAM …)


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

Adversarial examples

Definition

- Given a K-way multi-class classification model $f : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \{1, \ldots, K\}$ and an original example x_0, the goal is to generate an adversarial example x such that
  - x is close to x_0 and $\arg\max_i f_i(x) \neq \arg\max_i f_i(x_0)$
  - i.e., x has a different prediction with x_0 by model \$f\$.

Adversarial example

Attack as an optimization problem

- Craft adversarial example by solving
  - $\arg\min_{x} \|x - x_0\|^2 + c \cdot h(x)$
- $\|x - x_0\|^2$: the distortion

Adversarial example

Attack as an optimization problem

- Craft adversarial example by solving
  - $\arg\min_{x} \ ||x - x_0||^2 + c \cdot h(x)$
- $||x - x_0||^2$: the distortion
- $h(x)$: loss to measure the successfulness of attack

Adversarial example

Attack as an optimization problem

- Craft adversarial example by solving
  - $\arg\min_x \|x - x_0\|^2 + c \cdot h(x)$
- $\|x - x_0\|^2$: the distortion
- $h(x)$: loss to measure the successfulness of attack
- Untargeted attack: success if $\arg\max_j f_j(x) \neq y_0$
  - $h(x) = \max\{f_{y_0}(x) - \max_{j \neq y_0} f_j(x), 0\}$



How to find adversarial examples

White-box vs black-box setting

- Attackers knows the model structure and weights (white-box)
- Can query the model to get probability output (soft-label)
- Can query the model to get label output (hard-label)
- No information about the model (universal)

Adversarial example

White-box setting

- $\arg\min_{x} \quad \|x - x_0\|^2 + c \cdot h(x)$
- Model (network structure and weights) is revealed to attacker
  - $\Rightarrow$ gradient of $h(x)$ can be computed
  - $\Rightarrow$ attacker minimizes the objective by gradient descent

Adversarial example

White-box adversarial attack

- C&W attack [CW17]:
  - $h(x) = \max\{[Z_{y_0}(x) - \max_{j \neq y} Z_j(x)], -\kappa\}$
  - Where $Z(x)$ is the pre-softmax layer output

Adversarial example

White-box adversarial attack

- If there is $||x - x_0||_\infty$ constraint, we could turn to solve by
- FGSM attack [GSS15]:
  - $x \leftarrow \text{proj}_{x+\mathcal{S}}(x_0 + \alpha \text{sign}(\nabla_{x_0} \ell(\theta, x, y)))$
- PGD attack [KGB17, MMS18]
  - $x^{t+1} \leftarrow \text{proj}_{x+\mathcal{S}}(x^t + \alpha \text{sign}(\nabla_{x^t} \ell(\theta, x, y)))$

Adversarial example

Black-box Soft-label Setting

- Black-box Soft Label setting (practical setting):
  - Structure and weights of deep network are not revealed to attackers
  - Attacker can query the ML model and get the probability output



- Cannot compute gradient ∇_x

Adversarial attack

Soft-label Black-box Adversarial attack

- Soft-label Black-box: query to get the **probability output**
- Key problem: how to estimate gradient?
- Gradient-based [CZS17,IEAL18]:
- $$\nabla_x = \frac{h(x + \beta u) - h(x)}{\beta} \cdot u$$
- Genetic algorithm [ASC19]

Adversarial attack

Hard-label Black-box Attack

- Model is not known to the attacker
- Attacker can make query and observe hard-label multi-class output



- (K: number of classes)
- More practical setting for attacker
- Discrete and complex models (e.g quantization, projection, detection)
- Framework friendly

Hard-label black-box attack

The difficulty

- Hard-label attack on a simple 3-layer neural network yields a discontinuous optimization problem



(a) neural network $f(x)$ (b) $h(Z(x))$ (c) $h(f(x))$

Hard-label black-box attack

Boundary attack: based on random walk



Hard-label black-box attack

Limited attack

- Limited Attack: Monte Carlo method to get the probability output



Hard-label black-box attack

OPT-attack

- We reformulate the attack optimization problem (untargeted attack):

$$\theta^* = \arg\min_{\theta} \; g(\theta)$$

- where $g(\theta) = \text{argmin}_{\lambda>0} \left(f(x_0 + \lambda \frac{\theta}{||\theta||}) \neq y_0 \right)$

- θ: the direction of adversarial example



OPT-attack

Examples



Neural network decision function



$g(\boldsymbol{\theta})$



Boosting Tree decision function



$g(\boldsymbol{\theta})$

OPT-attack

Two things unaddressed

$$\theta* = \arg\min_{\theta} \quad g(\theta)$$

- where $g(\theta) = \text{argmin}_{\lambda>0} \left(f(x_0 + \lambda \frac{\theta}{||\theta||}) \neq y_0 \right)$
- How to estimate $g(\theta)$
- How to find $\theta*$

OPT-attack

Computing Function Value

- Can't compute the gradient of g
- However, we can compute the function value of g using queries of $f(\cdot)$
- Implemented using fine-grained search + binary search



OPT-attack

Estimation of $g(\theta)$

- Fine-grained search
- Binary search
  - Prediction unchanged enlarge g
  - Prediction changed shrink g



Adversarial defense

Adversarial training

- Adversarial training [MMS18]:
- $$\min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_x \left[\max_{\|x'-x\|_\infty \leq \epsilon} loss(\theta, x') \right]$$
- TRADES
- $$\min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_x \left[\underbrace{loss(\theta, x)}_{\text{clean acc}} + \underbrace{\lambda \max_{\|x'-x\|_\infty \leq \epsilon} loss(\theta, x')}_{\text{robust reg}} \right]$$

Adversarial defense

Customized adversarial training

- Adversarial training [MMS18]:
  - $\min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_x \left[\max_{\|x'-x\|_\infty \le \epsilon} loss(\theta, x') \right]$
- Problems:
  - Same large ϵ uniformly for all samples.
  - Force the prediction to match the one-hot label
- Solutions:
  - Adaptively assigns a suitable ϵ for each example
    - $\epsilon_i = \arg\min_{\epsilon} \{ \max_{x'_i \in \mathcal{B}_p(x_i, \epsilon)} f_\theta(x'_i) \neq y_i \}$
  - Adaptive label smoothing
    - $\tilde{y}_i = (1 - c\epsilon_i) y_i + c\epsilon_i \text{Dirichlet}(\beta)$.

Adversarial defense

Limitations

- Adversarial training [MMS18]:
  - $$\min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_x \left[\max_{\|x'-x\|_\infty \leq \epsilon} loss(\theta, x') \right]$$
- Attack dependency: The max doesn't have a closed form solution and is normally done by using adversarial attack (i.e. need several back-propagations).
- Adversarially trained network are sacrificing accuracy



Robustness verification

Why

- Many heuristic defense was broken under stronger attacks
- A verified model cannot be attacked by any attacks (including unforeseen ones)



Robustness verification

Basic formulation

- Consider a binary classification case:

x_0

Input is a **point**



Neural Network

$f(x_0) = 1.2$

Output is a score

$f(x_0) > 0$

Positive Example

$f(x_0) \leq 0$

Negative Example

Robustness verification

Basic formulation

- Suppose $f(x_0) > 0$, can we verify this property:

$$f(x) > 0, \forall x \in \mathcal{C}$$



Robustness verification

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

Input is a set

Neural Network

Output is a range/set of scores

$$\boxed{0.2} \leq f(x) \leq 2.2$$

"cat" even in the worst case

Robustness verification

Basic formulation

Assuming $f(x_0) > 0$, we solve the optimization problem to find the worst case:

$$f^* = \min_{x \in \mathcal{C}} f(x)$$

$\mathcal{C}$ is usually a perturbation set "around" x_0, e.g., $\mathcal{C} := \{x \,|\, \|x - x_0\|_p \leq \epsilon\}$





Is it a hard problem?

Robustness verification

Basic formulation

Multi-class case:

Data perturbed arbitrarily within a set



output bounds

(guaranteed score ranges)
2.3 ≤ cat ≤ 4.5
-0.8 ≤ dog ≤ **1.2**
-4.2 ≤ panda ≤ **-0.1**

we guarantee that "cat" stays top-1 under input perturbations



Robustness verification

How to solve?

This is the fundamental problem we want to solve (Wong & Kolter 2018, Salman et al. 2019):

$$f^* = \min z^{(L)}$$

Last layer output f(x), at layer L

pre-activation

$$\text{s.t.} \quad z^{(i)} = W^{(i)} \hat{z}^{(i-1)} + b^{(i)} \qquad i \in \{1, \cdots, L\}$$

Linear constraints

$$\hat{z}^{(i)} = \sigma(z^{(i)}) \quad i \in \{1, \cdots, L-1\}$$

Non-linear, non-convex constraints

post-activation

$$\hat{z}^{(0)} = x, \quad x \in \mathcal{C}$$

Input perturbations



Robustness verification

Types

- Convex polytope
- Randomized smoothing





Q&A

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